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Abstract 
 
      In this paper, we propose to transform the global matching mechanism in an electronic exchange between 
the producers and consumers in the SCM system for perishable commodities over large scale data sets.  
Matching of of consumers and producers satisfactions are mathematically modeled based on preferential 
evaluations based on the bidding request and the requirements data which is supplied as a matrix to Gale 
Shapely matching algorithm. The matching works over a very transparent approach in a e-trading environment 
over large scale data.  Since, Bigdata is involved; the global SCM could be much clearer and easier for 
allocation of perishable commodities. These matching outcomes are compared with the matching and profit 
ranges obtained using simple English auction method which results Pareto-optimal matches. We are observing 
the proposed method produces stable matching, which is preference-strategy proof with incentive compatibility 
for both consumers and producers.  Our design involves the preference revelation or elicitation problem and the 
preference-aggregation problem. The preference revelation problem involves eliciting truthful information from 
the agents about their types that are used for computation of Incentive compatible results.  We are using 
Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism design in our match-making settings where the agents’ preference 
types are multidimensional. This preserves profitability up to an additive loss that can be made arbitrarily small 
in polynomial time in the number of agents and the size of the agents’ type spaces.   
 
 
1. Introduction 
        The Indian government had established a number of public wholesale market yards for agricultural 
products that are called as “Mandi” and regulates these market yards through an Agricultural Produce Market 
Committees (APMC) Act [1].  A model has been created to match farmers and buyers in a wholesale market 
framework in [2], but, it is a typical implementation of English auction, where allocation takes place in multiple 
iterations. It is only based on bidding. It does not take into account, the typical satisfaction (in terms of quality, 
lead time etc.) of buyer/supplier into account while trading in a M*N match-making environment, which is 
considered in our work. 
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     We have implemented a e-commerce application for perishable commodities, we are insisting the effective 
matching mechanism of consumers and producers for perishable commodities.  Allocation of consumer and 
producer were done using Gale-Shapely Algorithm, where the matching mechanish is done based on Individual 
preferences.  Our proposed model is to make our matching an incentive compatible one.  The consumer and 
producer have their own preferences of price, lead-time, quality and location of delivery which acts as a 
mandatory parameters for match-making.    
     Let us assume we have a set of consumers who are buying multiple units of a single commodity (Eg. 
Tomato). We are grouping the consumers and producers parameter-wise for effective match making. These 
consumers are associated to a certain value of the parameters of each commoditiy.  The given commodity goes 
through many stages of allocation evaluation for generating preferential matrix for each consumer and producer 
for the given commodity. On each stage on computation,   there is at least one producer for multiple consumers. 
Each producer has his own bidding quote.  This applies on each of the stage of allocation which will have a 
limited amount of capacity for that particular round of allocation. The consumer’s valuation and the producers’ 
costs are assumed to be private information which is a mandatory parameterr for allocation. Based on 
preferential matrix, if no matching is happened for N consumers and M producers, the system allows the 
consumer and the producers can enter into a negotiation to finalize a match without affecting the producers 
bidding price range and the consumer's quoted price range.   This indicates the number of units that would be 
allocated, the producers who may be engaged in reducing the bidding price and a division of the left-over 
commodities from the transaction.  
     We are using BigData concepts in our SCM process[6] since the allocation of perishable commodities among 
global markets are very sensitve decision making which covers the lead-time and commuting strategies.  The 
application of this kind of Perishable SCM will definitely positively impact on GDP of our nation.  If 1 producer 
is enrolling for 5 commodities in a district there could be possibility of enrollment of 500 general public as 
consumer. A direct computations carries about 2500 iterations for match making at conceptual level.   We are 
having 4 mandatory parameters, which results in 4 parametersX1 producerX5 commoditiesX500 consumers = 
10000 allocation preferences.   We are ending up with 10,000 records for just 5 commodities with 500 
consumers.  Assume, if we do it state level, region level and national level.  It will results in very large set of 
data.  Without help of a BigData platform we cannot achieve the results.  Using this technique enables the 
commodity exchanges between villages, districts, states, regions and countries. 
2. Big data – Perishable commodities 
 
      Here we refer to Big Data representing a very large volume of consumer quotes and producers’ bidding data 
on  the types of commodities, that exponentially grows and deals mostly with structured data and rarely with 
incomplete information. These SCM data of Bigdata nature  is of  high volume, high velocity with a high variety 
information that requires new methods or forms of processing to enable enhanced decision making, insight 
discovery and process optimization. 3Vs model is frequently referred for describing big data. 
Volume- In our application producers’ data on available commodities and parameter bidding data along 
with consumers’ requirement data always been growing exponentially, from a single byte of data it has grown 
into peta bytes of data generated every hour with addition of different data sets. 
Velocity- Very large amount of SCM is generated and there an essential need that to be analyzed in real 
time, where the comparison and match-making is performed on real-time as long as the producer posts the 
availability and consumer posts their requirement or if the there is some left-over on available stock.  This is 
going to be a continuous iterations of match-making over a large data at very high speed since we are dealing 
with “perishable” commodities. 
          Variety – The requirements and availability can be in terms of text / images data. Consumer or producer 
could elaborate their availability/requirements in terms of text comments or real-time photos of their 
commodities which acts as a business enabler. 
 
3. Mechanism design for matching producers and consumers 
 
We assume a set of consumers i = {1,2…,m} and set of set of farmers j = {1,2,…n} posts the availability and 
requirements of commodities on our web based decision support system (e-DSS) system on BigData clould 
environment, with the preferred parameters.  Our DSS finds an optimal match using Gale-Shapely algorithm[4]. 
For a given commodity of given quality level and promised lead time, the farmer must submit his true valuation 
(bid price) to the e-DSS as a private information, along with his expected quality and lead time. The competing 
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bidders will not know the valuation of contending consumers. Similarly, the farmers will submit the ask price for 
their commodity of a quality grade in a closed form, along with their promised quality and lead time of supply. 
The satisfaction level of consumer and farmer is determined as follows: 
3.1Evaluation of Consumer Satisfaction Bij 
 
Bij={σ୩ୟୀଵ wia  * bija , 0}, bija  € (0,1);     (1) 
 
wherebija  is fitness function for consumer “i” over farmer j for attribute a. 
wia  is weight given by consumer “i” for attribute “a”. 
The attributes considered by the consumer are quality of produce, cost and lead time to supply. This demands true 
valuation of a commodity in terms of quality, lead time and bid/ask price from the consumer and producer 
respectively. This is modeled as follows: 
 
More is better: (Quality) 
             bija = ൞
ͳǡ୨ୟ ൒ ୧ୟ
ୟౠ౗ିୣ౟౗ౣ౟౤
ୣ౟౗ିୣ౟౗ౣ౟౤
ǡ ୧ୟ୫୧୬ ൑ ୨ୟ ൏ ୧ୟ
Ͳǡ ୧ୟ ൏ ୧ୟ୫୧୬
                (2) 
 
 
(i.e.)  If a supplier has commodities with high quality  with the expected price of the buyer who quoted for same 
price of low quality. 
 
Less is better:  (Price) 
              bija =൞
ͳǡ ୨ୟ ൑ ୧ୟ
ୣ౟౗ౣ౗౮ିୟౠ౗
ୣ౟౗ౣ౗౮ିୣ౟౗
୧ୟ ൏ ୨ୟ ൑ ୧ୟ୫ୟ୶
Ͳǡ ୨ୟ ൐ ୧ୟ୫ୟ୶
                (3) 
Where, 
aja = actual value of attribute “a” given by producer “j”,  eia = expected value of consumer “i” for attribute “a”,  
eiamin= Min expected value of consumer “i” for attribute “a”. 
eiamax= Max expected value of consumer “i” for attribute “a”. 
 
(i.e.) If a supplier gives the stock at less price with the expected quality of buyer who quoted for higher price. 
 
3.2 Evaluation of Producer Satisfaction Sji 
 
Producer satisfies only on the bid cost of consumer. 
Sji = ൞
ͳǡ ୠ୧ ൐ ୱ୨
୮ౘ౟ି୮౩ౠ
୮౩ౠି୮౩ౠౣ౟౤
Ͳǡ ୠ୧ ൏ ୱ୨୫୧୬
ǡ ୱ୨୫୧୬ ൑ ୠ୧ ൏ ୱ୨        (4) 
 
pbi = actual bid of  consumer “i”,  
psj = expected bid of producer “j”,  
psjmin = Min expected bid of producer “j”. 
 
The calculated preferences Bij and Sji are used for preferential matching using Gale Shapely algorithm. The GS 
algorithm calculates the profit of matching the registered producers and consumers using equation (5). 
 
                Profit =  σ ሺ୧ െ ୨ሻ כ ୧୨୧ǡ୨         (5) 
Where,  
୧୨ = quantity of trading between matched buying agent i and selling agent j. 
୧ = Bidding price per unit agreed upon in transaction by buying agent i 
୨ = Ask price per unit agreed upon by the selling agent j. 
 
 The following constraints are used in the mechanism design. 
  
                                     σ ୧ ൑୫୧ ୧         (6) 
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The total number of units allocated to a buying agent is less than or equal to its demand.  
 
                                     σ ୨ ൑୬୧ ୨             (7) 
The total number of units bought from a selling agent is less than or equal to its supply.  
 
                               σ ୧ ൑୫୧ σ ୨୬୨                    (8) 
The number of units sold does not exceed the number of units procured. 
When a consumer is interested in a quality ୧, it is okay if he is allocated a quality better than  ୧,. When a seller 
has an item of quality ୨, , it is okay if his allocation is for a quality lower than ୨ if he is getting the same 
price.(9) 
 
When a consumer intends to receive supply in a lead time of ୧, it is okay if he receives it in a lead time lower 
than ୧.  (10) 
 
 
4. Incentive compatible allocation for the matching-mechanism  
 
     We have already seen that our matching mechanism design involves using the preferential matrix for buyer 
and supplier that acts as a preference aggregation problem. The preference revelation problem uses the interested 
parameter information  from the producer and consumer agents about their types. In order to elicit truthful 
information, there is a need for validation of the parameters for a best response for the agents, consistent with 
rationality and intelligence assumptions. Incentive compatibility works to offering the right amount of incentive 
to induce truth revelation by the agents. There are broadly two types of incentive compatibility.  Firstly, truth 
revelation is a best response for each agent irrespective of what is reported by the other agents.  Secondly, Truth 
revelation is a best response for each agent whenever the other agents also reveal their true types. The first one is 
called dominant strategy incentive compatibility (DSIC) in which the budget balance is not feasible. So, we 
choose the second one Bayesian Nash incentive compatibility (BIC) since the truth revelation is always with 
respect to types, only direct revelation mechanisms are relevant when formalizing the outcomes of incentive 
compatibility on our proposed matching mechanism. When we are looking at the matches generated on our 
system  we are observing; 
 
1) While evaluating we are ensuring whether a allocation can make all its members better off, we must be sure 
about when the producers’ welfare should be evaluated. There are three stages - ex-ante, interim and ex-post, 
when this evaluation may be carried out.  
2) While defining what our allocation can do, we are ensuring that the agents will use all the parameters available 
to all its matching members in deciding upon a blocking plan which results to the definition of a fine core of 
match. 
3) After allocation, through we are playing a producer fair game, when we compute the profits for producer and 
consumer, each of them are mutually exclusive.  Producer is also making more profit and buyer is also with 
highest satisfaction level of purchasing goods. Both are benefited. 
 
If at all it is generating more profits for producer fair play, we tried to make this system incentive compatible 
one. It became feasible since in our e-DSS system;[13] Consumers and Producers gives cost curves to our 
system, Our SCM DSS using Gale-shapely algorithm seeks a cost-optimal combination that meets QoS levels. 
Here Echelon management is done over preferencial matrix which seeks to maximize profits of their units The 
Quoted cost curves need not be actual ones.  If there is no possiblity for allocation, then the producers' bid is 
reduced a bit and buyer's requirements were increased a bit then matching happens within their quoted range.  
We are getting a Cost-optimal chain formation based on preferential match, that satisfies specified QoS under 
Bayesian Incentive compatible computation levels since  
o We have designed an incentive compatible protocol (mechanism) to elicit true costs 
o We are solving an appropriate constrained optimization (since we are using price, lead-time, 
quality as mandatory constraints) problem without deviating the given values. 
4.1 Bayesian Incentive Compatible solution (BIC)[14] 
 
We are assuming all the data sets on availability / requirements are statistically independent. 
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ሺɅǡ Ʌ െ ሻ ൌ ȾሺɅ െ ሻ ൅ Ʌƿ െ ሾ͸ ൌ ሺ כ ሺɅǡ Ʌƿ െ ሻǡ Ʌƿሻሿ                 (11) 
 
In which Ⱦ ׷ ȣ െ  ՜    is the arbitrary function. 
 
Here we are choosing Budget Balance, such that the allocation strategy cannot be singleton.  
 
If  ൌ  ሺͳǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ǡ ሺ൉ሻሻ the set of suppliers falls into the matching function ݂ሺǤ ሻ under Bayesian Nash 
Equilibrium, then there exists the profile of strategies of all possible combinations of allocations  כ ሺ൉ሻ ൌ
ሺ כ ͳሺ൉ሻǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ  כ ሺ൉ሻሻ such that, 
 
ሺ כ ͳሺɅͳሻǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ  כ ሺɅሻሻ ൌ ሺɅͳǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ Ʌሻ׊ሺɅͳǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ Ʌሻ א ȣ                         (12) 
 
and  
Ʌ െ ൫൫ כ ሺɅሻǡ  כ െሺɅ െ ሻ൯ǡ Ʌ൯หɅ ൒ Ʌ െ ൫൫ᇱሺɅሻǡ  െ ሺɅ െ ሻ൯ǡ Ʌ൯หɅ 
                                                                           ׊ א ǡ ׊Ʌ א ȣǡ ׊Ԣሺ൉ሻ  א    ( 13) 
 
Condition 14 implies that 
Eθ−i ui(g(s כ i (θi), sכ −i (θ−i)), θi)|θi ≥ Eθ−i h ui(g(s כ i ( ˆθi), sכ −i (θ−i)), θi)|θi i 
׊i א N, ׊θi א Θi , ׊ ˆθi א Θi .               (14) 
 
Condition 12 and 14 implies that; 
 
Ʌ െ ሾሺሺɅǡ Ʌ െ ሻǡ ɅሻȁɅሿ ൒ Ʌ െ ሺሺƶɅǡ Ʌ െ ሻǡ ɅሻȁɅǡ ׊ א ǡ ׊Ʌ א ȣǡ ׊ƶɅ א ȣǤ     (15) 
 
The set of all social choice functions (for all producers and consumers) which are implementable in Bayesian 
Nash equilibrium and Bayesian Incentive Compatibility is the set of all social choice functions which are 
Bayesian incentive compatible. Here all buyers and suppliers were given initial incentive point of 100.  If 
delivery and acceptance are done at the given lead-time the points are incremented by 5.  If there is a problem 
on acceptance or delivery 5 will be decremented.  Based on supplier and buyer ratings on scale of 5 for each 
transaction, the ratings will be added to the original value. The ratings are treated as another parameter on 
allocation strategy. 
 
The agents are prioritized based on the net incentive value to fall under equation (2), (3) and (4) The matching 
happens  
 
 
5. Conclusions 
           
         We are observing matchings are stable in our system. When there does not exist any match (A, B) by 
which both A and B are individually better off than they would be with the element to which they are currently 
matched. If the participating agents, producers/consumers are rational and submit their true valuation of  a multi 
unit, single indivisible commodity to our decision support system (DSS), it is more likely that they get stable 
matches of allocation[15].  
     Also, the Gale Shapely algorithm customized to make the incentive compatible decision has been applied to 
produce optimal matches in a bilateral trading scenario, which is first of its kind application in an e-trading 
environment. Compared to many e- supply chain portals, the proposed model seems to be more realistic and 
transparent to the users in matching supplier and buyer which ensures the allocation with high profits. It is first 
of its kind implementation to the e-agricultural supply chain. We further would like to make our e-portal to take 
the complete governance responsibility and act as the key interface in selecting partners, setup and evaluate 
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performance metrics of the players, maintain accountability of material and services, provide feedback on 
operational status for the prospective development of its players. Our result on the non-emptiness of the 
incentive compatible matching mechanism that ensures either all buyers or all suppliers are alloted with their 
bids, This intermediate usage of incentive compatible core is a logical usage of parameters (axioms) 
exogenously imposed solution concept. 
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Appendix 
 
Website Drawbacks 
farmer.gov.in/ There is no trading mechanism. 
www.kisan.gov.in Just a farmer registration site. 
https://www.echo
upal.com 
 
 
It only reaches middle-sized farms. 
It acts as a mediator by getting list of farmers 
and their available commodities 
and gives information about available stock to   
registered buyers. 
http://www.agmar
knet.nic.in/ 
 
The system only sensitizes and orients farmers 
to respond to new challenges in agricultural 
marketing by using ICT as a vehicle of 
extension. 
www.ikisan.com No additional information. 
www.ekrishi.org 
 
There is no automatic mechanism to match 
farmers and consumers demand and supply. 
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